A robust hash function allows different parties to extract a consistent key from a common fuzzy source (e.g., an image gone through noisy channels), which can then be used to establish a cryptographic session key among the parties without the need for interactions. These functions are useful in various communication scenarios, where the security notions are different. We
study these different security notions in this paper and focus on forgery attacks, where the objective of the attack is to compute the extracted key (hash value) of a given message. We examine information-theoretical security against forgery under chosen message attacks, and we prove that it is not possible. In other words, the entropy of the hash value of a given message can be reduced arbitrarily when sufficient message/hash pairs have been observed. Furthermore, we give a computationally secure scheme, where it is computationally infeasible to compute the hash value even its entropy may not be high.
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A robust hash H is a function that maps an input message U X ∈ to a binary string such that, when given another message
where ' X is close to X , the hash of ' X remains the same as with high probability. In this regard, a robust hash function is different from a cryptographic hash function, which does not tolerate even a single bit of error. Furthermore, the domain b M can be real-valued, e.g., M can be feature vectors extracted from images.
Robust hash functions are very useful in secure non-interactive communications, where two or more parties wish to derive a session key from a common fuzzy source without interaction. Such a session key can then be used, for example, in identity verification or encryption.
A typical application scenario of robust hash functions is the protection against copying attacks, where attackers attempt to copy a legitimate watermark from a marked multimedia object to an unmarked object (Kutter et al. 2000 , Craver et al. 1998 ). In such scenarios, we could use a watermark that is dependent on the content of the multimedia object. To achieve this, a robust hash function could be employed to extract a key from the given multimedia object, and then a watermark could be generated from the extracted key. In this case, the communication parties would be the watermark embedder and detector, where the multimedia object serves both as a communication channel and the common fuzzy source to generate the watermarking key.
In this scenario, we would require that the hash function should be robust against the noise expected in the actual watermarking application, yet it should be difficult (if possible at all) to estimate this key generation process for an unmarked object.
SECURE ROBUST HASH FUNCTIONS 4 We note that the central part of the above security application is the extraction of the session key from the common fuzzy source. Therefore, in this paper, we are concerned with the more abstract key extraction scenario as illustrated in Figure 1 . Suppose two parties A and B have access to some correlated random sources X and ' X respectively (e.g., X and ' X could be the picture of the same scene taken at different times of the day), and they wish to agree on a common (secret) session key based on their own random source without communication. In this case, a keyed robust hash function ) (⋅ H can be applied to allow both parties to generate the same hash b using a shared key K . This allows both to decide upon a session key that they can use to do various tasks without directly using their shared secret key or exchanging any information as required by common key agreement protocols.
As we can see from Figure 1 , if X is an original multimedia object, and ' X is a watermarked object obtained by embedding a digital watermark into X , then the hash b that can be consistently extracted can be used to validate the authenticity of the multimedia object.
Nevertheless, such a consistent string can be used in many other scenarios, where it is desirable to extract a consistent key from noisy data.
b
Despite the potentials of robust hash functions, it is often not easy to analyze the security. This is perhaps partly due to the complexity of the interactions among many different parameters, which affect the robustness and security (such as collision and forgery resistance), and partly due to the lack of clear threat and attack models.
Roughly speaking, robustness of a robust hash function measures its tolerance to permissible noise, and collision resistance measures the difficulty of an attacker finding two dissimilar messages that yield the same hash value (more precise definitions will be given in later sections).
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In this paper, we study forgery resistance of robust hash functions (as in Swaminathan et al. 2006}) , which measures the difficulty for attackers to compute the hash value of a given message without knowing the secret key. Similar to settings used by Swaminathan et al. (2006) , we first investigate information theoretical security measured by conditional entropy. However, instead of considering just one message and its hash , we consider chosen message attacks,
where the attacker is allowed to observe (or probe the system to obtain) polynomially many message/hash pairs before attacking on a given message. We say that a robust hash function is non-forgeable if it is difficult for attackers to compute the hash of a given message even under chosen message attacks. We also investigate collision resistance of robust hash functions, since a hash function, no matter how robust, would not be so useful if it is easy to create collisions.
Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We give formal definitions of both information-theoretic and computational security of non-forgeable hash functions; (2) We show that information-theoretic security is not possible under chosen message attacks; (3) We give a computationally secure and practical scheme based on random quantization; (4) We give a sufficient condition for a robust hash function to be collision resistant, and show that it is achievable with practical constraints. Swaminathan et al. (2006) give a security model for analyzing the security of a robust hash, where they use differential entropy as a measure of security for randomized image features.
Related Work
It is also suggested that the security of a hashing scheme should be measured by the conditional entropy of the hashing key, when the hashing algorithm, and pairs of images and their hashes are SECURE ROBUST HASH FUNCTIONS 6 known. We formalize this notion and show that such information-theoretic security is impossible.
The robust hash proposed by Swaminathan et al. (2006) is specifically designed for an authentication application. There are existing works that analyze security models for authentication application scenarios. Some examples of proposed scenarios are as follows. Ge et al. (2006) analyze a scenario where A sends a message and an approximate message authentication code (AMAC) to B for verification. The AMAC serves as a keyed similaritypreserving function. Another scenario as discussed by Li and Chang (2006) We highlight that the scenario considered in this work represents a more general applicability of robust hash. In fact Mihcak and Venkatesan (2001) also propose a robust hashing algorithm to extract a consistent key from certain content but for watermarking application. Note that we also extract a consistent key, which can be used for authentication. Hence it is interesting to study the security of robust hash under the proposed scenario.
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Let M be the message space. We do not impose any constraint on M . For example, it can be the set of feature vectors from a database of images. The distribution of the message can be either discrete or continuous. Here we mainly use discrete distributions and entropies as examples. Similar definitions and proofs based on differential entropies can be easily adapted.
Let be a distance function defined over D
M . We consider the following definitions of hash functions and their properties.
Definition 1 (Hash Function) A hash function H is an efficiently computable function,
, where and
Here being "efficiently computable" means that H can be computed with a polynomial time deterministic algorithm. Such a hash function may have the following properties.
In many signal processing applications, sensitivity (i.e., resistance to random collisions) may be good enough. However, in security applications, we may need stronger notions of collision resistance.
Definition 4 (Negligible Function) A function is negligible if for any positive polynomial and any sufficiently large
SECURE ROBUST HASH FUNCTIONS 8 When we say a task is computationally infeasible w.r.t. a parameter k , we mean that the probability that this task can be done is a negligible function of . k
length k if for random and any polynomial time probabilistic algorithm
In other words, a hash function is collision resistant if it is computationally infeasible to find two dissimilar messages that can be hashed to the same value. Here indicates that
Furthermore, it is often desirable to make it difficult to forge hash values of noisy data without the secret key. It is worth to note that the forgery attacks as defined later are different from collision attacks. In forgery attacks, the goal of the attacker is to find the hash value of a given message, whereas in collision attacks, the goal is to find two dissimilar messages that yield the same hash. There are, however, certain connections between these two types of attacks. For example, if the collision probability of the hash function is high, a given message could itself collide with a message that has been observed by the attacker, which would lead to a successful forgery attack. In other words, security against forgery attacks implies collision resistance.
Furthermore, we consider chosen message attacks, where the attacker has the access to polynomial number of messages and their corresponding hash values, and the goal of the attacker is to find the hash value for another message that is not similar to any of the messages the attacker has seen.
Ideally, we would prefer information-theoretic security where it is possible, which is defined as the following. 
for all , and for 
That is, it should also be difficult to find the key K , since otherwise the attacker could just work out the key first and then compute the hash value of . 
given any , the probability
, ( for all , and the probability is taken over random choices of the key
and internal coin tosses of A .
In other words, it should be computationally infeasible for any attacker to come up with the correct hash value of a new message (which may be chosen by the attacker), even with observations of polynomial number of message/hash pairs. Furthermore, it is clear that forgery resistance implies collision resistance.
Lemma 1 If a hash function H is computationally secure against forgery under chosen message attacks w.r.t. distance function and threshold D δ , it is also
-collision-resistant, by definition there is a polynomial adversary A that can find, with a probability that is not negligible, a pair such that , and
. Hence, another adversary B can use A to find a collision pair first, inquire the hash oracle for the hash value ) ,
, and then output as the result of a forgery. Clearly, ) , ( b X B runs in polynomial time, and also succeeds with a probability that is not negligible. □
On the other hand, collision resistance does not imply forgery resistance in general. For example, cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1 are typically considered as collision resistant, but anyone can compute such hash functions for any given messages, and hence they are not forgery resistant by themselves. The same argument can be applied to robust hash functions.
Impossibility of Information-Theoretic Forgery Resistance
If the attacker has unbounded computation power and is able to probe the hash function with carefully chosen messages, or is able to observe previous independent message/hash pairs, SECURE ROBUST HASH FUNCTIONS 11 we can see that it is not possible to have a robust hash scheme that is secure against forgery. In particular, we have the following result. 
(2)
Proof: Since the key is independently chosen,
The second equality is due to the fact that the hash values are deterministically computed from the messages and the key, and the third equality is obtained by applying the chain rule. Since and (1), we have
By applying the chain rule, we have ) ,..., | (
Clearly, the first term in the summation is no larger than the rest of the terms. Hence, we have proved (2). □
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In other words, no matter how we choose the parameters and , as long as the attacker has enough number of independent observations (i.e., large enough ), the entropy of the hash value can be reduced arbitrarily. Hence the scheme cannot be informationtheoretically secure against forgery under chosen message attacks. As mentioned earlier, a similar proof using differential entropy for continuous distributions can be easily adapted.
It is also worth to note that even if the requirement (1) is relaxed such that the key K is only required to have conditional entropy the same as the hash value, the conclusion that the conditional entropy of the hash value can be reduced arbitrarily remains the same.
It is also noted that this proof does not depend on the robustness of the hash function. It is analogous to the known result that perfect secrecy cannot be achieved with fixed length keys.
A Sufficient Condition for Collision Resistance
As we have mentioned earlier, a robust hash that is ) , , ( s s D ε δ -sensitive may be sufficient in some applications, but more rigorous collision resistance is needed in typical security applications. Here, we show that a robust and collision resistant hash function can be built using the robustness and sensitivity properties of the underlying hash function. Note that sensitivity differs from collision resistance in that the former only measures the collision probability of randomly chosen inputs. Therefore, what we need is a way to make it difficult for attackers to construct structured inputs to the hash function, and would be forced to choose random ones.
To achieve that, we will need a special type of transformation on M such that the neighborhood relationship among messages as measured by some distance function will be roughly preserved under the transformation, yet the transformation looks random without the access to a secret key. First, we need to define a uniform transformation ensemble on Note that this definition differs from classical definition of uniform function ensembles in cryptography in that, the domain and co-domain of the functions (i.e., M ) may not be a discrete space, and it is fixed in advance.
Next, let us consider an oracle adversary as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F A A that can make polynomially many queries to an oracle that computes the function , and each query costs constant time. We further consider a limited set of queries that the adversary can send as follows. In the context of robust hash functions, it is typically required that such transformation is also robust.
To construct a collision resistant hash function, our main idea is that, given a message 
where is uniformly selected, and
Proof: Assume on the contrary that H is not ) , ( s D δ -collision-resistant, by definition we have a polynomial adversary A that can find, with a probability that is not negligible, a pair of
, for uniformly chosen . We only need to show that we can construct another polynomial time algorithm
The robustness of the hash function as constructed in the above theorem can be similarly determined if the robustness of the transformation and hash function involved can be determined.
In particular, we have the following. 
is uniformly selected, and
The correctness of the above corollary directly follows from the definitions.
A Robust Hash Scheme
In this section, we consider input space M to be real vectors of size . This is a natural representation of many types of features that can be extracted from multimedia data.
n Let Q be a random composite scalar quantizer, which consists of two sub-quantizers and . Both sub-quantizers are uniform quantizers with the same step size 0 Q 1 Q λ 2 , but the quantization levels are interleaved such that the minimum distance between the quantization levels of and that of is
The quantization levels of both sub-quantizers are labeled as interleaving 0's and 1's, and the output of the sub-quantizers will be the label of the nearest quantization level. The quantizer Q takes in two inputs, namely a random bit r and an x to be quantized. Based on the random bit r , either quantize Q x with or . That is,
We assume that there exists an error-correcting code C that allows us to correct errors in a binary string of length , where is a parameter depending on the number of bit flips to be tolerated for the required robustness.
t n t
We further assume that there exists an encryption scheme with encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm , and the encryption scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. That is, .
The first two steps are commonly used techniques to handle permissible noise, such that at the end of the second step, we would obtain a binary string that is close to the original, measured by some distance metric, say, Hamming distance. The error-correcting code in the third step is to correct a small number of bit flips in the binary string. The design of such an error-correcting code can be challenging if the length of Y is large, and the errors can be bursty.
For typical applications, we can employ the two-layer error-correcting technique by Hao et al. (2006) , or a suitable LDPC code (MacKay and Neal, 1997) such as those used by Martinian et al. (2005) and Draper et al. (2007) . If the distance metric is not Hamming, the error-correcting code ˆ should be adapted accordingly (Mihcak and Venkatesan, 2001) . The last step of decryption provides the actual security property that we need.
Security Analysis
The security of the hash function as stated at the beginning of this section largely depends on the security of the underlying encryption scheme. In particular, we require the encryption scheme to be secure under chosen ciphertext attacks.
Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is secure if for any given ciphertext, it is computationally infeasible for any attacker to compute the corresponding plaintext. Furthermore, it is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if the security can be maintained even the attackers observed a priori the plaintext corresponding to polynomial number of ciphertext at his choice.
More formally, let Σ be the set of all possible binary plaintext, we have If A is a successful attacker, the result would be exactly the plaintext corresponding to W , which means we would also be successful in attacking the underlying encryption scheme under chosen ciphertext attacks. This contradicts with the assumption, hence the theorem is proved. □
Further Discussions on Security
It should be noted that in many real applications, we are not given directly a sequence of numbers, but rather images, audio or video data. As a result, the security of the actual system depends not only on the security of the robust hash, but also depends on the quality of the features, in the sense that it should be difficult to find another multimedia object that is very different yet yields the same features. However, the similarity metric largely depends on the application scenario. How to select such good features is out of the scope of this paper.
It is also worth noting that we apply an error-correcting code to extract a consistent string from the noisy data. In practice, such codes are usually not perfect. As a result, to achieve required robustness, sometimes it would correct more errors than necessary. In this case, the attacker might be able to exploit the property of the error-correcting code to create a collision on a chosen message X by constructing dissimilar objects ' X that have features that fall within the error-correcting capability, hence creating a forgery on the constructed object ' X by re-using the hash value of X .
In our scheme, however, we include a randomization step (the first step) that will help to diffuse the feature coefficients in a key-dependent manner, such that it would be difficult for the attackers to make use of the error-correcting code. This step can be considered as a pseudorandom transformation as defined in Definition 10, when the number of message-hash pairs known by the attacker is not large enough to invert the randomization matrix. For example, when the messages are real vectors of length 600, the transformation is generally not invertible given less than 600 message-hash pairs, and we can achieve collision resistance as analyzed in previous sections.
Conclusions
A robust hash allows the extraction of a consistent key from noisy data, such as images.
This can be useful in many application scenarios, ranging from authentication to session key agreement. An example of such applications is watermarking schemes resistant to copy attacks, where the watermarks are generated from a key extracted from the content, so that directly copying the watermark makes it useless. Another example is key distribution with noisy data, where two or more parties agree on a consistent key based on a common noisy random source, without the need for communication as other key agreement protocols do.
In this paper we study the security of robust hash functions against forgery, under chosen message attacks. In these attacks, the attacker is allowed to observe or probe the system to access polynomial number of message/hash pairs, and the goal of the attacker is to compute the hash of another given message that is dissimilar to all previous observations.
We give formal definitions of the security of robust hash against forgery under chosen message attacks (both information-theoretic and computational). We show that informationtheoretic security is not possible. This answers one of the open questions stated by Swaminathan et al. (2006) . That is, it is not possible for the hash value in question to have conditional entropy that is not negligible, while keeping enough entropy for the secret key. Furthermore, we give a scheme that is computationally secure.
We also analyze the collision resistance of robust hash functions in the presence of smart attackers who attempt to carefully craft messages to create a collision. We give a sufficient condition that allows us to build a collision resistant robust hash function using a pseudo-random SECURE ROBUST HASH FUNCTIONS 22 transformation and a robust and sensitive hash function. We show that such collision resistance can be achieved in our proposed scheme under practical constraints. 
